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Abstract 
 
At the height of the financial crisis, the Western welfare state prevented a repeat of the Great 
Depression. But there were also suggestions that social policy had contributed to the crisis, 
particularly by promoting households’ access to credit in pursuit of welfare goals.  Others 
claim that it was the withdrawal of state welfare that led to the disaster. Against this 
background that motivated our interest, we propose a systematic way of assessing the 
relationship between financial market and public welfare provisions. We use structural vector 
auto-regression to establish the causal link and its direction. Two hypotheses about this 
relationship can be inferred from the literature. First, the notion that welfare states 
‘decommodify’ livelihoods or that there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff would suggest that 
welfare states substitute to varying degrees for financial market offers of insurance and 
savings. By contrast, welfare states may support private interests selectively and/or help 
markets for households to function better; thus the nexus would be one of complementarity.  
Our empirical strategy is to spell out the causal mechanisms that can account for a 
substitutive or complementary relationship and then to see whether advanced econometric 
techniques find evidence for the existence of either of these mechanisms in six OECD 
countries. We find complementarity between public welfare (spending and tax subsidies) and 
life insurance markets for  four out of our six countries, notably even for the United States. 
Substitution between welfare and finance is the more plausible interpretation for France and 
the Netherlands, which is surprising. Data availability constrains us from testing the 
implications for the welfare state contribution to the crisis directly but our findings suggest 
that the welfare state cannot generally be blamed for the financial crisis.
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1. Introduction: The welfare state and financial markets 
At the height of the financial crisis, in 2009-10, the Western welfare state (along with 
unprecedented central bank interventions) prevented a repeat of the Great Depression with its 
haunting images of male breadwinners queuing for a meal. The built-in stabilizers of welfare 
states, i.e. progressive income taxes and unemployment benefits, worked effectively (Furceri 
2009, Dolls et al 2010). In the early stages of the crisis, this was even a source of pride (or 
hubris) in Europe that Christine Lagarde, then French finance minister, expressed succinctly: 
‘The difference is that the French model provides shock absorbers that were already in place. 
We haven’t had to reinvent our unemployment, health or welfare systems.’ (Economist 2009: 
28)  
But there were also suggestions that social policy had contributed to the build-up of a 
potential for crisis, particularly by promoting households’ access to credit in pursuit of 
welfare goals. In the US, this had ended with the subprime loan disaster that triggered the 
Great Recession (Committee 2009, Shiller 2008). In Europe, one could cite the privatization 
of pensions that exposes households to considerable retirement date risks when stock markets 
plunge and wipe out a considerable amount of lifetime savings. Low interest rates since 2007 
reduce the value of pension funds and the providers as well as the sponsors of occupational 
pensions have started to raise their concerns about central bank policies (Cohen 2013, OECD 
2012).2   
Others claim that it was the withdrawal of state welfare that led to the disaster (Schwartz 
2012). After the Golden Age of welfare expansion, financial markets were liberalized and 
welfare state provisions partly privatized, presumably forcing households to take recourse to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Institute (LSE), especially from Margarita Gelepithis, as well as from conference audiences at SASE in Boston, 
at EUSA in Baltimore and at a workshop of a research network on Nordic welfare states in Berlin.  
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financial markets. Innovations in mortgage finance made it possible to acquire nest-eggs in 
the form of homes with ever lower down payments, and not only for old-age security but also 
the financing of medical expenses or the education of children (Ansell 2011). Seabrooke and 
Schwartz (2009) assembled a number of scholars who extend this story for the US to 
European countries.  
Hence, the financial crisis since 2008 has thrown a question into sharp relief for which the 
comparative welfare state literature has few answers (Schelkle 2012a): What kind of 
relationship between private finance and social welfare spending do these different accounts 
assume? Do they contradict each other fundamentally or are they just different empirical 
observations regarding the crisis but assume the same structural relationship? And what do 
the underlying relationships imply for the role of welfare states in the crisis and its build-up? 
In this paper, we propose a systematic way of assessing the relationship between financial 
markets and public welfare provisions, using structural vector auto-regression, to establish 
the causal link. Data availability constrains us from testing the implications for the welfare 
state contribution to the crisis directly but our findings speak to the proposition that the 
welfare state is partly to blame for the crisis. 
Our paper proceeds as follows: The next section infers two hypotheses about the finance-
welfare state nexus from the literature, bearing in mind that these approaches were developed 
with a view to the employment relationship centered on labor markets. The third section 
spells out the empirical method to search for causal mechanisms between private finance and 
social welfare, including our case selection. The fourth section presents the empirical 
findings. They consist of cross-sectional structural vector auto-regressions (SVAR) for four 
European and two non-European welfare states with ex ante very different configurations of 
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 The FT quotes consultants Mercers estimating that a drop of 0.10% in bond yields adds 2% to the pension 
liabilities of firms (Cohen 2013).  
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social spending and degree of financialization. The conclusions summarize our findings about 
the finance-welfare state nexus and spell out their implications for the contribution of the 
welfare state to the financial crisis. 
 
2. Two views of the finance-welfare state nexus  
The relationship between public welfare and private finance has been explicitly discussed in 
the welfare state literature at least once, for the specific case of pensions and housing finance. 
Kemeny (1980) and Castles (1998) were the protagonists in a debate on why the prevalence 
of homeownership may be associated with a small welfare state, especially low public 
pensions. Kemeny made taxpayers’ resistance responsible for lean pension provisions, i.e. 
where homeownership is high, indebted households of working age resent being taxed for 
generous social spending. Castles, by contrast, argued that the ‘big tradeoff’ results from the 
fact that a weak welfare state provides incentives for homeownership as a nest-egg. In other 
words, homeownership can act as the equivalent of a social insurance mechanism (see also 
Conley and Gifford 2006). The two scholars disagreed on the exact motivation of and the 
causal link in this relationship, with Kemeny putting taxpayers’ resistance at the beginning 
while Castles made underdeveloped safety nets responsible for households taking recourse to 
commercial sources of security.
 Ansell (2011) has recently provided evidence for Kemeny’s 
argument, namely that Thatcher’s policy of privatising council housing was predicated on a 
self-fulfilling promotion of homeownership: households who acquired a home change their 
preferences and resent higher taxes to finance benefits. But all three authors agree that private 
finance substitutes for public welfare and vice versa. 
This debate ties in with the mainstream of comparative welfare state research. In the tradition 
of Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation, the power resources theory of Walter Korpi and 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen conceptualized all public welfare as ‘decommodifying’ labor by 
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replacing earnings with income and in-kind transfers  (Esping-Andersen 1990: 3). Logically, 
this reasoning extends to financial markets: insofar as non-market income replaces earnings 
in the case of incapacity or unemployment, workers and their dependants have also no need 
to take recourse to savings, debt or private insurance. The welfare state decommodifies 
household finance, too. But what we do not know is how this comes about: is the more or less 
generous substitution of financial markets by the welfare state also the outcome of a political 
struggle of labor for protection from the vagaries of the capitalist economy (Iversen 2006) or 
were there other political forces at work that led to a similar, decommodifying outcome? 
Trumbull’s work suggests that we have to research this more specifically even though the 
attitude of organized labor to household credit plays a role in the story (Trumbull 2012). 
In this political conceptualization of a substitutive relationship, the Polanyi tradition in 
welfare state research is backed by the old mainstream in welfare economics, from Pigou’s 
Economics of Welfare (1920) to Okun’s big tradeoff between equity and efficiency (1975). 
Welfare economists in this tradition agree that redistribution must be pursued against the 
tendency of market forces to settle for income maximizing but inequitable outcomes. In 
financial markets, this means that low-income or marginally employed individuals are 
excluded from access to credit, that homeownership is out of reach for most households and 
that women with their longer life expectancy get considerably lower annuities from an 
insurance plan. Policymakers who want to correct for these inequities must be prepared to 
forego aggregate income by taxing the well-off or rein in financial innovation in order to 
correct the resulting inequality.  
Despite these eminently plausible arguments for substitution, there is also a relevant strand in 
welfare state research that implies complementarity between public welfare and private 
finance. For instance, the welfare state guarantee of a minimum income may have allowed 
the popularization of banking after WWII enabling households to incur long-term financial 
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obligations, from mortgage credit to savings and insurance plans. Moreover, even the 
protagonists of the mainstream often remind policymakers that public welfare may have 
productivity-enhancing effects (Esping-Andersen 1997) although this is not entirely 
consistent with the conceptualization of welfare interventions as decommodifying.  
We can discern a pessimistic-political and an optimistic-economic view of complementarity. 
The pessimistic version goes back to Richard Titmuss (1958) who had reservations against 
the very notion of a ‘welfare state,’ not only because of its teleological undercurrent3, but also 
because the term concealed state patronage of special interests.
 
He singled out the interests 
attached to ‘occupational welfare,’ i.e. all employment related benefits, and professionals in 
social services themselves. In both cases, special interests push for an extension of the 
welfare state and market provisions for social purposes like private health insurance and 
pension plans through tax-subsidies.
 4
   The increasing influence of financial interests should 
give the concomitant development of welfare states and financial markets a new impetus. The 
work of Howard (1997) and Hacker (2004) on the ‘hidden welfare state’ provide evidence for 
this link, specifically their studies of how risks of old-age security and health have been 
privatized with the help of tax expenditures, supported by lobbies of private providers as well 
as middle-class electorates.  
A more optimistic version of a complementary relationship can be found in the new 
economics of the welfare state that rationalizes social policy interventions systematically as 
ways of correcting market failure (Barr 1992, 2012: ch.4). Competition in areas of health, 
pensions or insurance is actually self-defeating, with less coverage and less income 
                                                          
3
 Titmuss (1976: 219) resented the notion of a welfare state because it created the myth of finality that ‘has led 
to the assumption that most – if not all – of our social problems have been – or soon will be – solved. Those few 
that remain will, it is thought, be automatically remedied by rising incomes and minor adjustments of one kind 
or another.’ 
4
 In this, he can be seen as a predecessor of the new politics of welfare (Pierson 2001; Weir et al 1988) in that 
Titmuss stressed that social policy creates its own stakeholders. Swenson (2002) provides evidence for Titmuss 
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generation in its wake.  Yet in the presence of public interventions that rein in exploitation, 
exclusion and opportunistic behaviour, financial markets may flourish and at the same time 
satisfy individual and collective needs. The relatively new and burgeoning strand in 
behavioural financial economics that studies households supports this message for poor, 
unsophisticated or naïve investors (Campbell 2006). Lindert (2003) popularized the message 
by noting that the ‘welfare state looks like a free lunch,’ achieving both equity and efficiency. 
His solution to the puzzle is that contestation among interest groups and electoral politics 
provide a check on overly generous benefits that favour predominantly certain groups.  This 
leads, on average and in the long run, to welfare states that exploit the spectrum of policies 
not subject to the big trade-off between equity and efficiency.   
Even the most optimistic new welfare economist would admit, however, that substitution may 
result from households’ budget constraints.   If social insurance is quite high and raised 
further, there may be little room for private pensions or private health insurance until the 
efficiency gains feed into higher net incomes. This suggests that we need to interpret the 
effect of welfare interventions dynamically: while more generous social benefits that are 
financed by higher taxes and social insurance contributions at first lower private spending on 
welfare and financial products, they should in the medium to long run increase it because 
disposable income rises thanks to the better functioning of labor, goods and insurance 
markets. For empirical research, this means that we have to trace the relationship between 
welfare spending, taxation, household income and financial products like insurance or 
mortgages over time.   
A third possibility is that there is no predictable connection between public welfare and 
private finance. Rising income may be the omitted variable that drives both the development 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
empirical claim on ‘occupational welfare’, notably the role of employers in the expansion of the welfare state in 
the US and Sweden. 
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of the welfare state and of financial markets, possibly at different speeds and time horizons. 
Moreover, the causalities may run in both directions: big welfare states may crowd out 
finance where they were established before the Big Bang in the 1980s. In turn, strong 
financial services, including those of households invested in the service, may prevent public 
offers from developing beyond a minimal level because a strong industry lobby and a private 
ownership ideology oppose them, a possibility that is compatible with the work of Ansell 
(2011) and Hacker (2004). Our empirical research design can uncover this third possibility of 
no significant relationship between welfare and finance as well as reverse causation or 
feedback effects. 
What do these two views imply for the role of the welfare state in the financial crisis? For the 
sake of clarity, we can simplify them in the following way: the notion that welfare states 
‘decommodify’ livelihoods suggest that welfare states substitute to varying degrees for 
financial market offers of insurance and savings, hence social policies did not contribute to 
the crisis. On the contrary, only where public welfare was withdrawn significantly, as in the 
US, would this hypothesis predict that households were pushed into risky financial 
transactions to make up for this withdrawal. If, however, welfare states help markets 
generally and financial markets for households particularly to be politically viable and 
economically more efficient, then the welfare state may have contributed to the most severe 
crisis of the post-war era. The exact ways of how social policy complements financial market 
provisions may make a difference still, however. Hence there is the possibility that welfare 
states underpin financial markets but did not necessarily contribute to the financial excess of 
the 2000s.
5
 
3. The SVAR methodology 
                                                          
5
 This was arguably the case of the housing bubbles and policies in France and the UK, in contrast to the US 
(Schelkle 2012b). 
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This section first explains why we use the econometric technique of structural vector auto-
regression (SVAR), then which causal mechanisms between public welfare and private 
finance we assume and finally which data we use. This section can be skipped as the next 
section on the findings is self-contained; but readers who are mildly interested in the 
methodology can rest assured that we tried to keep this section as non-technical as possible. 
 
3.1 The VAR method 
 
VAR models are used if one wants to estimate time series that are presumably interrelated by 
more than just time, i.e. in more than a random way. Theory must tell us what could make for 
the presumption of a non-random correlation. In the present context, the two views outlined 
above propose that welfare state interventions are devised so as to either substitute for market 
provisions or complement market provisions; in other words, they claim (opposite) causal 
relationships for reasons of organized interests and economic functionality.  SVAR estimates 
allow us to find out whether we have good reason to believe the relationship exists, what the 
nature of it is (substitutive or complementary) and how it may develop over a finite time 
horizon.
6
  
Structural is a characterization in contrast to ‘behavioural’ and refers to the fact that these 
time series of variables may be related to each other like in a simultaneous equation model, 
so that we could predict the effect of an exogenous change (an ‘intervention’) on all variables 
at once through the system of equations.
 7
 In contrast to simultaneous equation models, 
however, SVARs allow us to be agnostic as to which functional form exactly generates this 
systematic and predictable relationship between series of variables. Also, SVARs are post-
Lucas critique in the sense that, ex ante, a ‘shock’ can affect all variables (notably because the 
                                                          
6
 It is important to note that we still impose causality and do not strictly establish it. For a first attempt at doing 
the latter see Bayoumi and Bui (2010).  
7
 The following has benefitted from Sims (2002). 
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change was expected), rather than assume that such a change affects only a subset of 
variables directly and deterministically. 
The first go at the data, the VAR estimates, allows us to find out whether there is a more than 
random relationship between the time series of variables. This relationship can itself change 
over time, i.e. analogous to a dynamic simultaneous equation model but without all the 
problems that dynamic simultaneous equation models run into, such as complex modelling 
and/or very specific theoretical assumptions. This possible change over a horizon of 10 
periods is revealed, on the one hand, by the variance decomposition in which we look at how 
much of the variance of a variable (such as a financial market variable like life insurance 
premia) is driven or explained by the variance of the other variables in the model (we are 
particularly interested in welfare state variables). Since we do this for all variables, we can 
also capture feedback effects (for instance whether variance in a welfare state variable is 
explained by private social spending or a financial market variable). On the other hand, we 
look at impulse responses which we get when all but the variable under consideration (say 
life insurance premia) are shocked by 1%. The results can be read like elasticities (i.e. the 
percentage change of a dependent variable in response to a 1% change in the independent 
variable, in the example just given: life insurance premia). We can also infer whether the 
impulse response of the financial market variable to a 1% increase in the welfare state 
variable is negative or positive, thus revealing a substitutive or complementary relationship, 
respectively. The relationship may even change over the time horizon of 10, in other words 
we may detect that a social spending shock first leads to lower spending on financial products 
(substitution due to households’ budget constraints) but become complementary in the 
medium to long run (complementarity due to rising income). Our time horizon of 10 means 
over ten years as we use annual data. We tested for optimal lag length of our coefficients, 
using standard tests, and found a lag of 2 to be optimal.  
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3.2 Data issues and country cases 
The relationship between finance and social welfare has received much less scholarly 
attention than the connection between finance and growth (Levine 2005). This can explain 
the limited data availability on items of household (in contrast to corporate) finance for 
European countries that reaches back to the early 1980s. This is slowly changing, however. 
The World Bank collects and publishes time series of indicators of financial development 
(Beck et al 2010) that contain some useful data, such as deposit-to-GDP ratios. The OECD 
has detailed and more meaningful data on social expenditure (Adema et al 2011). Other data 
sources include the IMF and Reuter’s EcoWin, in particular for advanced economies that are 
our focus. 
8
 
As a consequence, our country case studies had to be selected not least on the basis of data 
availability. Only annual data make sense while typical SVAR applications, such as business 
cycle studies, use monthly or quarterly data. Indicators on household finance, such as 
mortgage credit or private pension assets, do not reach back any further than the early 1990s 
for European countries. This is too short for a valid SVAR and excluded Scandinavian 
countries. Relevant US statistics go back to the 1960s and cover a much larger range of 
indicators. We therefore selected Canada and the US as non-European countries, and France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Spain with reasonably complete data for at least one relevant 
household finance indicator, namely life insurance premia. In the following, we outline the 
relevant differences between these countries and locate them in their relevant peer group, i.e. 
advanced democracies. Our sample period stretches from 1982-2011. 
How do our country cases compare with respect to our key variables, public and private 
social spending?  The OECD provides the most widely used measure on the size of welfare 
                                                          
8
 The ECB started to build up a database on household debt and wealth that stirred controversy when first 
published (De Grauwe and Ji 2013, ECB 2013). 
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state, gross public social expenditure on both cash transfers and services.  But this does not 
include social spending that makes for a ‘hidden welfare state,’ notably tax expenditures to 
stimulate private spending on social policy purposes. Willem Adema and his collaborators at 
the OECD now publish regularly a measure that includes benefits that are distributed through 
the tax system, i.e. the various forms of tax breaks for social purposes such as saving for old 
age or buying child care. Moreover, they correct the gross, i.e. before tax, measure for the 
fact that benefits can be taxed and that beneficiaries pay taxes on their consumption.
9
 The 
alternative measure also takes into account that governments make private spending on social 
purposes mandatory, for instance force employers or wage earners to buy private accident 
insurance. Finally, governments also incentivize voluntary private spending for social 
purposes by making such spending tax-deductible, for instance on private health insurance.
10
 
Hence, the research carried out by Adema et al since the mid-1990s allows us now to take 
some of these indirect and hidden ways of public welfare provision into account.  
The following graph shows for 20 OECD countries
11
 just before the crisis how the ranking of 
welfare states according to size changes as we move from measuring gross (before tax) 
public social expenditure to net (after tax) total (public and private) social expenditure. The 
latter measure, shown as blue dots, has not only taken into account a number of tax breaks for 
social purposes (TBSPs), direct taxes on benefits as well as indirect taxes on beneficiaries’ 
spending, but also mandatory and voluntary private social spending.  It is social expenditure 
in that it is for a ‘social purpose’ (i.e. serving one of nine policy areas) and involves 
compulsion and/or interpersonal redistribution incentivized by tax advantages (Adema et al 
2011: 90-94, Gilbert 2010).  
                                                          
9
 Indirect taxes are sometimes compensated, for instance when energy taxes go up, (poor) pensioners may get a 
higher winter fuel allowance.  
10
 The tax incentives for private spending are counted as Tax Breaks for Social Purposes (TBSPs) which are 
then deducted from the amount of private social expenditure, so as to avoid double counting. 
11
 Greece and Switzerland had to be left out because there was no breakdown of social expenditure available. 
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Figure 1: Ranking of welfare states according to size, based on two measures (2007, as 
% of GDP) 
                
  
Source: OECD SOCX database 2011 
France is the country with the highest social expenditure, whatever measure we use. Germany 
is high, especially when tax benefits are taken into account, the Netherlands is middle while 
Canada and Spain are in the lower half of rankings on both measures. The most dramatic 
change occurs for the US. With about 16 percent of GDP, the US is at the bottom of the lot 
when welfare state size is measured in terms of gross public social expenditure while it is the 
fifth largest behind Sweden when tax expenditures and private channels of social spending 
are taken into account: voluntary but tax-advantaged private health insurance adds more than 
10% (gross and net). Yet Canada, Germany and the Netherlands also have a sizeable ‘hidden’ 
welfare state in the sense that their social expenditure is higher than the headline figure of 
gross public spending reveals. Spain is the only country in our sample that, like the 
Scandinavian countries, reclaims a considerable share of public benefits by taxing transfer 
income and/or the consumption of transfer recipients (like that of everybody else); therefore, 
Spain moves in its net social expenditure ranking below the Netherlands and Canada. 
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In terms of financial market development, we can look first at the ‘financialization’ of the 
economy from the supply side, namely measured as the contribution of financial activity to 
output, in contrast to manufacturing. Financial services include finance (intermediation), 
insurance, real estate and business services. The striking picture here is that France is not 
only the highest social spender but the share of financial services in value added is almost as 
high as in the US; if we find complementarity at all, we should find it for France. The US 
resembles France with respect to this indicator of financialization (share of financial services 
in contrast to manufacturing). It is also striking that even in Germany, with its manufacturing-
based export-oriented economy, financial services contribute more to national income than 
manufacturing (higher than in the Netherlands). This is also the case in Spain that 
experienced the most dramatic deindustrialization over these years. Canada is not included as 
its data in KLEMS has neither been standardized nor updated. 
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Figure 2: Financial services and manufacturing, value added as percentage of GDP 
(1980-2007) 
  
Source: EU KLEMS Database  
Household indebtedness is another, demand-side indicator of financialization. This time 
series is not available back to the 1980s for all countries which we therefore could not include 
into our SVAR estimates.   
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Figure 3: Household debt as percentage of disposable income 
 
Source: André (2010, fig.8) 
Here, the Netherlands is the country with the highest household debt. This can be attributed, 
until recently, to very high tax incentives for mortgage credit that made Dutch households 
hold on to one purely for tax purposes.  Our other country cases range in the middle (Canada, 
Spain, US12) to the low end (Germany, France). Germany, along with Japan, was the only 
country where households reduced debt as a share of disposable income between 2000 and 
2007, a tribute to the depressed development of real wages over these years. We can also see 
that it matters a lot for the characterization of countries how financialization is defined and 
measured: the US and France in particular appear as highly financialized if we look at the 
supply side of finance, but not necessarily so if we look at the demand side. Last but not least, 
this last graph destroys the myth that financialization did not reach the household sector in 
Europe. 
Given the limits on data availability and our interest in (European) welfare states, the only 
relevant indicator for household finance that was available for all these countries over a 
reasonable time span were (life and non-life) insurance premia. Life insurance is an 
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equivalent for survivor benefits and a savings product for old age like pensions. Table 1 gives 
a snapshot of how important life insurance was in 2007, and whether life insurance was likely 
to contribute to old-age security of insurance holders through annuity markets, or served as a 
benefit for their survivors.   
Table 1: Select insurance indicators in comparison, 2007 
 Density of all 
insurance 
(premiums per 
capita, in US-$) 
Life insurance, 
share as % of 
total insurance 
premia 
Penetration of 
life insurance 
(gross 
premiums as 
share of GDP) 
Type of annuity 
market 
Canada 3,404 46.0 3.4 Immediate 
annuity, purchase 
at retirement 
France 4,745 59.8 7.4 Residual, small 
market 
Germany 2,707 41.8 3.1 Deferred annuity, 
purchase during 
working years 
Netherlands 3,944 56.0 4.8 Mix of immediate 
and deferred 
annuities 
Spain 1,663 40.8 2.2 No information 
United 
States 
3,864 39.1 5.2 Immediate 
annuity, purchase 
at retirement 
EU-15 4,015 62.4 6.6 n.a. 
OECD 3,267 52.3 5.5 n.a. 
Sources: OECD Insurance Statistics, Rusconi (2008) for annuity markets 
The first observation is that insurance markets in our sample generally have a normal size(as 
measured by density); with the exception of relatively big France, they are somewhat smaller 
than the EU-15 average but higher than the OECD average. Life insurance markets, as a 
share of the total and in terms of penetration of the economy, are actually relatively small in 
Canada, Germany, Spain and the US; only France and the Netherlands reach above or 
average OECD  levels. Yet, these markets are not insignificant either, except perhaps in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12 For a more detailed analysis of how household finances changed over time in the US, see Gerba (2013). 
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Spain.  The last column, finally, gives us an idea of whether life insurance serves as a 
substitute or top-up for survivor benefits or as a savings vehicle for old age. Deferred 
annuities
13
, prevalent in Germany and with a significant market share in the Netherlands, are 
a classic instrument for the latter as they are acquired over a life-time, often through a life 
insurance that pays out after a fixed term. In Canada and the US, these annuities are likely to 
be acquired by liquidating shares while life insurance is a form of survivor benefit. Real 
estate assets, acquired through a mortgage credit over a lifetime, are an important vehicle of 
old-age savings in all countries except Germany. Unfortunately, only the US has data that 
goes back long enough for using our SVAR model. 
3.3 The model  
A model in SVAR boils down to the ordering of variables – this ordering is what gives it the 
‘structure,’ i.e. the theory underpinning the estimation.14 The first variable is assumed to 
determine the second and all subsequent variables, the second the third and all subsequent 
and so on. At the same time, the second can have feedback effects on the first, the third can 
have feedback effects on the first and second variables etc. The VAR set-up has in the first 
row all the variables in their ordering and in the first column each variable with a one- and a 
two-period lag.  
Our first model for the six countries consists of the following ordering (all six series of 
variables are measured in natural logs)
15
: 
                                                          
13
 Annuities turn a lump sum of savings into an income stream until the end of life. 
14
 More precisely, the Cholesky decomposition of the impulse responses requires an identification of the causal 
relationship between the variables of the model; the model cannot identify the causation as such. 
15
 We tried out many more specifications but this one worked reasonably well in terms of significant VAR 
estimates. For robustness purposes, we also estimated the country-specific VAR ordering Output per capita first 
in the model.  
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Public social spending per capita  Taxes and social security contributions per capita 
 Output per capita  Private social spending per capita  Average annual earnings 
 Ratio of life insurance premia to non-life insurance premia 
We think this captures the line of reasoning in old and new welfare economics and can be 
supported with political considerations, indicated in the ‘Two views’ section. We start with 
two fiscal variables, public social spending and (redistributive) taxes. The ordering implies 
that we assume governments determine their desired level of spending first and raise revenue 
in line with their spending plans. The two welfare state variables then determine private 
sector variables, such as GDP, private spending on social purposes and average earnings. The 
fiscal variables can affect output negatively (the neoclassical distortionary-taxation story) or 
positively (the New Keynesian market-failure-amended story). Output or value added in 
production determines private social spending because of households’ budget constraint. This 
determines average earnings, either because firms adjust their output so that productivity 
justifies the level of social benefits (neoclassical reading) or because the quality of work and 
the functioning of markets is directly affected by social benefits (New Keynesian reading). 
Finally the financial market variable is a measure of insurance premia: spending on life 
insurance as a form of saving for old age and private survivor benefit.
16
  It rises with earnings 
as households tend to get more of everything as long as it is not an inferior good and because 
individuals tend to get more risk averse as they become more affluent (these behavioural 
assumptions are standard and apply across economic theories).  
Schematically, the two theoretical narratives can be further simplified as they concern the 
relationship between the first set of fiscal variables and output as well as the relationships 
between  private social spending and earnings. The following matrix summarizes the 
possibilities: 
                                                          
16
 The use of a ratio works best in a technical sense because it increases the size of the variable compared to the 
others and scales it in a way that controls for the bigger size of insurance markets in France compared to Spain, 
to take the two extremes in our sample (table 1).  
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Table 2: Theoretical lines of causation 
Polanyi 
tradition/ Old 
welfare 
economics 
Titmuss 
tradition/ 
New welfare 
economics 
Public social 
spending and 
taxes/ SSC 
Economic 
output 
Private social 
spending, 
earnings and 
spending on  life 
insurance 
Public social 
spending and 
taxes/ SSC 
n.a. 
 
 
 
n.a. 
Negative 
(distortion) 
 
Positive (less 
market failure) 
Negative 
(substitution) 
 
Positive 
(complement) 
Economic 
output  
Negative 
(distortion) 
 
Positive (less 
market failure) 
n.a. 
 
 
 
n.a. 
Positive 
 
 
 
Positive 
Private social 
spending, 
earnings and 
spending on life 
insurance 
Negative 
(substitution) 
 
Positive 
(complement) 
Positive 
 
 
 
Positive 
n.a. 
 
 
 
n.a. 
Source: see section 2 
For the interpretation of our results, this means we have a direct effect of public welfare 
(spending, taxes and social security contributions) on the financial variable (insurance 
premia). It can be negative (substitution, due to decommodification and distortion of 
economic activity) as in the upper left-hand corner, or it can be positive (complementarity, 
due to piggybacking and amendment of market failures). We also have an indirect effect that 
works through output on private spending and private finance which reinforces the direct 
effect through households’ budget constraint.  
To arrive at hypotheses regarding plausible findings, we can exploit the diversity of our six 
countries. They represent, ex ante, a diverse set of configurations as regards welfare state size 
and the relevance of financial markets for their economies. More specifically, the 
configurations vary with the size of social spending, the extent of the hidden welfare state 
(discrepancy between public and private social spending) and the degree and nature of 
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financialization. So we might expect, depending on the configuration, different outcomes 1) 
for the basic public welfare-private finance nexus depending on the size of public social 
spending and the degree of financialization: substitution is more likely where they have 
different sizes as in the US and complementarity if they are both substantial as in France. The 
other country cases are less clear-cut but we tend still to complementarity since they are, in 
the OECD context, fairly large welfare states and fairly financialized economies. This basic 
relationship may be qualified 2) by the level of public social spending in relation to private 
social spending (the hidden welfare state): substitution is more likely where they are of 
opposite size (Canada, France, US), while weak or no causation is expected where they are 
both in a medium range (Germany, the Netherlands) or comparatively low as in Spain -- 
always taking into account that private social spending is generally lower than public. So this 
would reinforce the finding of substitution for the US but reduce the hypothesized 
complementarity for Canada and France. Finally, the basic nexus may be reinforced 3) by the 
relationship between the hidden welfare state and private finance: we should expect 
complementarity where private social spending and financialization are both comparatively 
high (Canada, Germany, Netherlands, US); this would strengthen the complementarity 
between public welfare and private finance in the first three countries but also substitution for 
the US. Thus, we are interested in this third relationship more for its significance than the 
direction which makes no difference; but it might be interesting for the politics of the 
finance-welfare state nexus, answering the question whether the financial industry and/or 
middle-class households are joint or separate forces behind the expansion of the hidden 
welfare state.  Table 3 summarizes our conjectures. 
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Table 3: Summary of country characteristics and hypothetical relationships 
 Relevant 
characteristics of 
the national 
political economy 
1 Do public 
social spending 
and taxes cause 
private 
finance? 
2 Does public 
social spending 
cause private 
social 
spending? 
3 Do private 
social spending 
and tax 
subsidies cause 
private 
finance? 
Canada Moderate to low 
social spending, large 
hidden welfare state; 
low financialization 
Complementary 
(i.e. positive 
causation) 
Positively, 
leaves room for 
private spending 
and incentivizes 
it 
Reinforcing 
complementarity 
France High social spending, 
no hidden welfare 
state; high supply-
side financialization 
Complementary 
 
Negatively, 
crowding out 
private spending 
Weak or non-
existent 
relationship 
Germany High social spending, 
some hidden welfare 
state; high supply-
side financialization 
Substitutive (i.e. 
negative 
causation), 
complementary 
in the long run 
Weakly Reinforcing 
complementarity 
Netherlands Medium social 
spending, some 
hidden welfare state; 
high financialization 
Complementary Weakly Reinforcing 
complementarity 
Spain Moderate to low 
social spending, no 
hidden welfare state; 
high demand-side  
financialization 
Complementary None, leaves 
room for private 
spending but 
discourages it 
Weak or non-
existent 
relationship 
United 
States 
Low public and high 
private social 
spending, large 
hidden welfare state; 
high supply-side 
financialization 
Substitutive Positively, 
leaves room for 
private spending 
and incentivizes 
it 
Reinforcing 
substitution 
 
4 Cross-sectional evidence from six mature welfare states 
As outlined above and summarized in tables 2 and 3, we tried to answer three theoretically 
and empirically motivated questions: 
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a) Does public social spending indeed cause spending on financial products like life 
insurance that can substitute for or complement public provisions? We can answer this by 
looking at the SVAR estimates (t-statistics) together with the vector decomposition, the 
latter allowing us to pick up the dynamic of the causal link as well as feedback effects 
from private to public social spending.  
b) What is the direction of this causation, if any, i.e. are social spending and taxation 
substitutive or complementary to products sold in insurance markets? For an answer, we 
look at the impulse response of (the time series of) the insurance market variable because 
this tells us its elasticity. 
c) What are the significant drivers of (life) insurance premia or financial markets more 
generally? The sources for an answer are the same as under a) and answer a question that 
is of theoretical interest.  
In the following, we summarize our results and document them in the appendix. To take first 
our quest for the public welfare-private finance nexus:  we find evidence for these drivers of 
insurance markets in every country but to varying degrees. We start with a caveat, namely 
that the SVAR estimates of the drivers we can identify in the variance decomposition are not 
all significant. But since the variance decomposition is more relevant, given the quality of the 
data that is highly correlated, we concentrate on the latter. The first set of graphs for each 
country in the Appendix, i.e. Canada (1), France (1) etc. shows the variance decompositions 
of each variable which is relevant for the causal significance. Our primary interest is in the 
graph to the bottom right for each country (Variance Decomposition of LNLPRM, i.e. for the 
natural log of the life insurance premium ratio); within this graph we look at how much of the 
volatility in the insurance market variable is explained by the blue line with white dots 
(LNPSCAP, i.e. the natural log of public spending per capita) and the red line with dots 
(LNTCAP, i.e. the natural log of taxes per capita). The second set of graphs, under Canada 
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(2), France (2) etc, shows the impulse response, which is relevant for the direction of 
causation, once we have established significance.  Here, again, we look primarily at the graph 
to the right-hand bottom for each country (Response of LNPRM) and within each graph what 
kind of changes in LNPRM, a rise or a decline, are caused by the public social spending 
variable (LNPSCAP), the tax variable (LNTCAP) and private social spending (LNPRSCAP). 
Table A1 summarizes the results of these graphs. 
Canada  
We find for Canada quite significant effects of both public social spending and taxes. The 
public social spending variable explains more than 30% of the variance in the insurance 
market variable after two horizons, the tax variable between 30% initially and 20% later; this 
suggests a fairly strong public-welfare-private finance nexus for Canada. The impulse 
response of the insurance variable to the public spending shock is first negative and then 
positive, the other way round for taxes. Private social spending is indeed caused by public 
social spending, first increasing and then lowering it. Private spending is also a significant 
driver of the insurance ratio, explaining more than 20% of its variance over the entire 
horizon. The response of the insurance variable to a private spending shock is first positive 
and becomes negative after three years. The connection between public and private spending 
is thus reinforcing the long-run complementarity between public welfare and private finance.  
France 
We find for France a significant effect of both public social spending and taxes, although less 
than in Canada. The public social spending variable explains more about 10-15% of the 
variance in the insurance market variable after two horizons; so does the tax variable. There 
is an immediate positive impulse response of the insurance variable to the public spending 
shock that becomes negative and then peters out. The response to the tax innovation is 
positive. Private social spending is negatively affected by a public spending innovation, i.e. 
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there is crowding out. In turn, private spending is also a significant driver of the life insurance 
premia, explaining about 20% of the variance in insurance over the entire horizon. There is a 
strong immediate positive response of insurance to a private spending shock that remains 
positive over the entire time horizon. The interaction between public and private social 
spending and the latter’s impact on the insurance premium can explain why France seems to 
have a substitutive connection between public welfare and private finance. 
Germany 
Here we find quite significant effects of public social spending but not taxes. The public 
social spending variable explains 25-30% of the variance in the insurance market variable. 
The impulse response of the insurance variable to the public spending shock is immediately 
positive, becomes negative after two years and positive again in the last two years. The 
response to a tax shock is first negative but peters out quickly. Private social spending is also 
a significant driver of the life insurance premia, explaining about 10% of its variance after 
three years. Private social spending is significantly affected by public social spending, first 
rising and then declining in response. The response of insurance to a private spending shock 
is first negative and then becomes positive. So, taken together, the effect of social spending 
on private finance is ambiguous and while the public part is likely to dominate the overall 
effect, private spending may tilt it towards complementarity.  
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is the mirror image to Germany as regards significant drivers: public social 
spending is not while the tax variable is, explaining between 10 and 15% of the variance.
 17
  
However, there is a negative impulse response of the insurance variable to a public spending 
shock. The impulse response to a tax shock is still stronger and also negative. Private social 
spending is significantly affected by a public spending shock and declines in response. But 
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private spending is not a significant driver of the life insurance premia, yet there is first a 
positive response of the insurance variable to a private spending shock that becomes quickly 
quite negative. 
Spain 
We find for Spain a weakly significant effect for public social spending, explaining only 
about 5-10% of the variance in insurance, while the tax variable explains almost 20% after 
two horizons. There is a strong positive impulse response of the insurance variable to a public 
spending shock, the reverse holds for taxes. Private social spending is caused by public 
spending, and rises with a delay. Private spending is a more significant driver of the life 
insurance premia, explaining almost 20% of its variance over the entire horizon. But the 
response of the insurance variable to a private spending shock is negative. So we have a 
somewhat ambiguous relationship between social spending overall and private finance, 
although public welfare seems to be complementary. 
United States 
The US estimate shows quite significant effects of both public social spending and taxes. The 
public social spending variable explains between 60% and 40% of the variance over the time 
horizon, taxes between 15-20%! This suggests an even stronger public-welfare-private 
finance nexus for the US than for Canada. There is first a weak negative impulse response of 
the insurance variable to the public spending shock that then becomes strongly positive, while 
the reverse holds for the tax shock. Public social spending causes private spending first to fall 
and then to rise. Private social spending is also a significant driver of the life insurance 
premia, explaining about 20% of its variance on average over the horizon. The response to a 
private spending shock is negative, i.e. the latter diverts spending on life insurance relative to 
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 This result for the Netherlands confirms what was said with respect to tax incentives for mortgage debt above 
and is also visible in graph 1. 
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non-life insurance. This may reflect the fact that incentives for private spending in the US are 
targeted on health care and housing, not life insurance.  
Regarding our basic question of whether public welfare substitutes for or complements 
private finance, our findings are mixed. We find complementarity in Canada, Spain and the 
US, to some extent also in Germany, for public social spending. This interpretation takes into 
account that any increase in public social spending is likely to make households spend less on 
private provisions at first, because they have less demand for the latter but also because they 
face a tighter budget constraint if this leads to higher taxes (public spending causes taxes to 
respond positively and are fairly significant for the variance in taxes in Canada and with a 
delay in France, Germany and the US). But as time goes by, public spending has a positive 
effect on output (significant and positive in Canada, with a delay in France, Germany, and the 
US), households and private providers piggy-back on the public services at the margin, hence 
public welfare and private spending on insurance complement each other over time.
18
 The 
finding for the US contradicts our expectations where we would have expected substitution, 
given the combination of low public social spending and a large hidden welfare state. 
Substitutability of private finance and public welfare is the most plausible interpretation for 
the Netherlands and with a delay France. Both findings are unexpected, especially in the case 
of France, due to its combination of high public and low private social spending with a highly 
financialized economy.  
The fact that the impulse responses of insurance markets to taxes are typically the mirror 
image of public spending is quite reassuring. If private social spending is typically 
incentivized by tax subsidies, then lower tax revenue means higher subsidies for private 
spending and vice versa. So, in fact, this is in line with a story of complementarity between 
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public welfare (here foregone tax revenue) and private finance for social purposes (here life 
insurance). Again, France is the exception while the US joins the European mainstream – 
both unexpected and possibly due to specificities of their insurance markets. 
For robustness purposes, we also ran a SVAR(2) specification with  output per capita ordered 
before public social spending and taxes per capita. This means that automatic stabilizers as 
well as structural social policies play a role while our initial model concentrated on cyclically 
adjusted (‘structural’) social policies only. Impulse response results are reported in brackets 
in Table A1. We do not observe any significant or systematic deviations from our initial 
estimates. The only outlier is the impulse responses of US output per capita to the six shocks, 
where there is some difference (albeit small) between our benchmark model and the current 
(modified) model. However, the emphasis of our analyses is on the impact of innovations in 
the economy on social spending and household finances. Thus for our purposes, the minor 
divergence in the responses of US output per capita are of secondary importance. This 
implies that our SVAR(2) model is robust  to the type of social spending/social policies 
considered. In turn, this means that the majority of policies affecting public and private social 
spending are structural, and not business cycle driven. That is an important finding since we 
can firmly discuss spending behaviour and alterations to these from a structural perspective. 
Finally, we do not find a robust relationship of private social spending and insurance premia. 
This is a surprising non-finding. One would have thought that when insurance premia vary, 
this is explained largely and triggered largely by impulses from private social spending. But 
only in Canada, France and the US does private spending explain more than 20% of the 
variance in the insurance variable. Moreover, the signs of the impulse response are first 
positive and then negative, whether the hidden welfare state is sizeable (Canada) or actually 
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 This dynamically varying response in five rather different countries can explain why we do not necessarily 
find a significant VAR estimate for the entire time series. The effects neutralise themselves over time even 
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the reverse (Spain); and the response is positive where there is no significant net private 
social spending (France) and where the hidden is two thirds of the visible welfare state (US). 
We would find complementarity, i.e. a positive variation, more plausible for the private part 
of social spending as paying for insurance is part of it. One possibility is that our measure of 
voluntary private spending does not capture the spending on insurance as it may be 
mandated. Or, as in the US, the tax incentives go towards other purposes. Only a closer look 
at country cases can tell. Table 4 summarizes our results. 
Table 4: Summary of causal relationships in our model for six welfare states 
 1 Do public social 
spending and tax 
subsidies cause 
private finance? 
2 Does 
public 
social 
spending 
cause 
private 
social 
spending? 
3 Do private 
social spending 
and tax 
subsidies cause 
private 
finance? 
Relationships 
as expected?  
Canada Yes, first negative, 
then positive: 
Complementarity 
Yes, first 
positive, 
then 
negative 
Yes, private 
spending 
substitutive and 
tax subsidies 
complementary  
Yes, except for 
(3) private social 
spending and 
insurance 
premia 
France Yes, first positive 
and then slightly 
negative: 
Substitution 
 
Yes, 
negative  
Yes, both 
substitutive 
No 
Germany Yes, spending first 
positive, then 
negative, positive 
again; tax subsidies 
positive with delay: 
(Complementarity?) 
Yes, first 
positive, 
then 
negative 
Yes, private 
social spending 
first 
complementary, 
then 
substitutive, tax 
incentives 
complementary  
Yes, although 
complementarity 
rather weak 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
though there is an effect at any point in time. 
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Netherlands Weak, spending 
negative, tax 
subsidies positive:  
(Substitution?) 
Yes, 
negative 
Weak, tax 
incentives and 
private 
spending 
complementary 
No for public 
spending, yes 
for tax 
incentives and 
private spending 
 
Spain Weak, positive: 
Complementarity 
Yes, first 
negative, 
then positive 
Weak, private 
spending 
substitutive, tax 
incentives 
complementary  
Yes, although 
(3) gives 
ambiguous 
results 
United 
States 
Yes, first negative, 
then strongly 
positive: 
Complementarity 
Yes, first 
negative, 
then positive 
Mixed, private 
spending 
substitutive, tax 
incentives 
complementary  
No for public 
spending, yes 
for (2) and for 
(3) tax 
incentives  
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5 Conclusions 
Our model establishes a link between public welfare and private finance (in the guise of life 
insurance premia relative to non-life premia) that so far hardly anybody in comparative 
welfare state research or in financial economics has even looked for. For four of the six 
OECD countries we looked at, the finance-welfare state nexus seems to be one of 
complementarity. The economic links via taxes and output on private social spending are also 
broadly in line with the new economics of the welfare state, even in France where we find a 
substitutive relationship.  We were surprised that the United States, with its small visible and 
large hidden welfare state plus a financialized economy, shows complementarity between 
public welfare and insurance markets. But the connection is far from universal and at least 
two countries with big welfare states and highly financialized economies, either on the 
supply-side (France) or on the demand-side (Netherlands), seems to have a substitutive nexus 
between public welfare and private finance. In the Netherlands (and in Spain), the economic 
link is more in line with the old welfare economics, i.e. equity through more social spending 
would come at the cost of foregone output.  
We inferred the complementarity hypothesis theoretically from an account of the welfare 
state inspired by Richard Titmuss (1958). His work on the welfare state – a term he resented -
- stressed the private interests that attach themselves to the benefits of public welfare and use 
it for their own, not necessarily intended purposes, for instance to reduce the risk of private 
insurance. Another, more optimistic version of this complementarity can be inferred from the 
new welfare economics, which is interested in the range of policy options that escape the 
equity-efficiency tradeoff because redistributive policies may also alleviate market failures. 
The latter could actually explain why we found lagged complementarity between public 
social spending and private finance in four countries, even in the US: higher public social 
spending raises earnings (typically with a lag), which then feeds into the purchasing power 
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for financial products. This would suggest that France and the Netherlands have exploited the 
symbiotic range of equity and efficiency enhancing policies that instrumentalize financial 
markets, the latter compete for private welfare provision with the state. 
The prevalence of complementarity in our sample raises the question whether the welfare 
state has been implicated in the creation of a potential for the financial crisis: if markets for 
household finance flourish on the back of the welfare state, the welfare state may have made 
them flourish too much. We note, however, that Canada and Germany had no problem with 
over-indebted households while France and the Netherlands had housing bubbles even 
though the collapse was not disastrous. The latter are the countries for which we found 
substitution to be the more plausible direction of causation. All we can say at this stage is that 
there is no simple line of causation. Spain and the US are candidates for a worrying role in 
the crisis even though the former has no hidden welfare state while the latter has a very big 
one. We must leave further explorations into the finance-welfare nexus of the crisis for 
another paper. 
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Appendix 
SVAR(2) – 6 OECD Countries 
Model 1: [Public Social Spending per capita (LNPSCAP), Taxes per capita (LNTCAP), 
Output per capita (LNGDPCAP), Private Social Spending per capita (LNPRSCAP), Average 
Annual Earnings (AAE), Life-to-Nonlife ratio of insurance premia (LNLPRM) ¦ Government 
debt (LNGOVDEB)] 
CANADA (1) 
Figure A1: Canada –Variance Decomposition 
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CANADA (2) 
Figure A2: Canada –Impulse Responses 
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FRANCE (1) 
Figure A3: France – Variance Decomposition 
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FRANCE (2) 
Figure A4: France – Impulse Responses 
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GERMANY (1) 
Figure A5: Germany –Variance Decomposition 
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GERMANY (2) 
Figure A6: Germany –Impulse Responses 
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THE NETHERLANDS (1) 
Figure A7: Netherlands – Variance Decomposition 
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THE NETHERLANDS (2) 
Figure A8: Netherlands – Impulse Responses 
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SPAIN (1) 
Figure A9: Spain –  Variance Decomposition 
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SPAIN (2) 
Figure A10: Spain – Impulse Responses 
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UNITED STATES (1) 
Figure A11: United States – Variance Decomposition 
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UNITED STATES (2) 
Figure A12: United States – Impulse Responses What kind of response (positive or 
negative) does a standard deviation innovation in the endogenous variable (column) 
cause over a horizon of 10 years? 
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What kind of response (positive or negative) does a standard deviation innovation in the 
endogenous variable (column) cause over a horizon of 10 years? 
Do endogenous variables (column) explain more than 20 per cent of the variability in each AR 
variable (row)? 
Table A1: OECD SVAR(2) model results, impulse responses and strongly significant 
variance decomposition. 
Country 
Impulse 
Responses 
LNPSCAP LNTCAP LNGDPCAP LNPRSCAP LNAAE LNLPRM 
 LNPSCAP Pos Pos/Neg* Pos Pos/Neg* Neg (0) 0 
 LNTCAP Pos** Pos/Neg Pos (0) Neg* Neg Neg 
Canada LNGDPCAP Pos* Neg* Pos Neg** Neg Neg 
 LNPRSCAP Pos/Neg** 0 (Pos) Neg Pos Pos Pos 
 LNAAE Pos/Neg** Pos* Neg (0) Pos* Pos (0) 0 
 LNLPRM Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg* Pos Pos/Neg** Neg* Pos/Neg 
 LNPSCAP Pos/Neg Neg/Pos 
Pos/Neg 
(Neg/Pos) 
Neg Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg 
 LNTCAP Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg Pos (Pos/Neg) Pos Pos/Neg* Neg/Pos 
Germany LNGDPCAP Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg* Pos/Neg Pos* Pos Neg 
 LNPRSCAP Pos/Neg* 0 (Pos) Neg Pos/Neg Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg 
 LNAAE Neg* Pos Pos* Pos Pos Pos (0) 
 LNLPRM Pos/Neg/Pos* Neg/Pos (Pos/Neg) Neg/Pos* Neg/Pos Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg 
 LNPSCAP Pos/Neg (Pos) Pos Pos* Pos/Neg* 0 Neg 
 LNTCAP Pos Pos* Pos Pos/Neg 0 0 
Netherlands LNGDPCAP 0 Pos (Neg/Pos) Pos 0 Pos Pos 
 LNPRSCAP Neg* Neg* Neg** Pos Pos* Pos 
 LNAAE Pos Neg Pos** Pos Pos Pos 
 LNLPRM Neg Neg Pos/Neg** Neg/Pos (Pos) Pos* Pos 
 LNPSCAP Pos Pos Neg/Pos* Pos* Neg (Pos/Neg) Pos* 
 LNTCAP Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg Pos (Neg/Pos) Neg Pos*(Neg/Pos) Neg 
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Country Impulse 
Responses 
LNPSCAP LNTCAP LNGDPCAP LNPRSCAP LNAAE LNLPRM 
France LNGDPCAP Pos Neg Pos/Neg Pos/Neg Pos Neg 
 LNPRSCAP Neg* Pos* Pos Pos Neg Pos 
 LNAAE Pos Neg* Pos Neg* Pos Neg* 
 LNLPRM Pos/Neg* Pos Neg Pos* Neg* Pos 
 LNPSCAP Pos/Neg Pos/Neg* Pos* Neg/Pos Pos Pos/Neg 
 LNTCAP Neg Pos/Neg Pos Pos Pos Neg 
Spain LNGDPCAP Neg Neg* Pos Neg Pos* 0 
 LNPRSCAP Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg* Pos (Pos/Neg) Pos/Neg Neg/Pos* 
(Pos) 
Neg 
 LNAAE Neg (Pos/Neg) Neg Pos* Neg Pos Pos 
 LNLPRM Pos Neg Neg Pos/Neg Pos Pos 
 LNPSCAP Pos/Neg Neg/Pos/Neg* Neg/Pos 
(Neg/Pos/Neg
) 
Neg/Pos/Neg 
(Pos/Neg) 
0 0 
 LNTCAP Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg/Pos Neg 
(Pos/Neg/Pos) 
Neg 0 0 
US LNGDPCAP Neg/Pos**(Neg/Pos/Ne
g) 
Pos/Neg*(Neg/Pos) Pos/Neg 
(Pos/Neg/Pos) 
Pos/Neg*(Neg
) 
0 (Pos) 0 
(Neg/Pos/Neg
) 
 LNPRSCAP Neg/Pos** Pos Pos Pos/Neg 0 0 
 LNAAE Neg/Pos* Pos/Neg* Pos/Neg Neg* Pos 0 
 LNLPRM Neg/Pos** Pos/Neg* Neg (Pos/Neg) Neg* Pos Pos 
 
 (*) At least 20% of the variation in the AR variable is explained by this endogenous variable. 
 (**) At least 50% of the variation in the AR variable is explained by this endogenous variable.   
Information in brackets are impulse responses from the SVAR(2) specification where LNGDPCAP is ordered first. This is for robustness 
purposes. 
 
 
 
